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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Watkins Company, LLC ("Watkins"), appeals from the First Amended Judgment and 
order of the district court awarding $72,312.36 in attorney's fees and costs to The Estate of 
Michael Storms ("Storms") and his corporation, Brownstone Companies, Inc. ("Brownstone"}. 
The district court correctly determined that Storms and Brownstone could recover attorney's 
fees on some claims (i.e., from their defense of Watkins' claims), but could not recover 
attorney's fees for others (i.e., their counterclaim for damages based on a wrongful temporary 
restraining order). However, the district court committed reversible error when it apportioned 
90% of Storms' and Brownstone's total attorney's fees to the contract defense and only 10% to 
the counterclaim based on the court's "familiarity" with the case and because the court spent 
only 10% of its written findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the counterclaim. As 
shown below, when a party may recover attorney's fees for some claims but not for others, the 
memorandum of costs and affidavit of counsel must provide the district court with a 
meaningful segregation between the recoverable attorney's fees and the unrecoverable 
attorney's fees. Because the district court's award does not comply with Idaho law and is not 
based on substantial, competent evidence in the record, this Court should set aside the First 
Amended Judgment, vacate the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Storms and 
Brownstone, and remand with instructions for the district court to award only those attorney's 
fees actually attributable to the claim for which fees are recoverable. 
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OF PROCEEDINGS 
In September 2010, Watkins filed a complaint against Storms and Brownstone, primarily 
for breach of contract, and seeking a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief 
(co!!ectively, "TR0").1 Through a series of hearings, motions, and orders, the district court 
granted in part and denied in part Watkins' motion for TRO and required that Watkins post a 
surety bond for $10,000.00. 2 Subsequently, Watkins amended its complaint twice. 3 When 
Storms and Brownstone filed their answer to the second amended complaint, they included a 
counterclaim for damages arising from the wrongfully entered TR0.4 Watkins filed its reply to 
the counterclaim, denying liability.5 
Trial of the matters occurred over various dates from March 18, 2014, to July 29, 2014.6 
On November 19, 2014/ the court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and resulting Judgment. 8 The court awarded Watkins $669.64 on its complaint, and awarded 
Storms and Brownstone $10,000 on their counterclaim, an amount limited by Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 65(c) to the amount of the surety bond.9 
1 RVol.l,p.17. 
2 R Vol. I, p. 88-90. 
3 R Vol. I, pp. 27, 38. 
4 R Vol. I, p. 66. 
5 R Vol. I, p. 72. 
6 R Vol. I, pp. 11-13. 
The Register of Actions indicates the date of filing as November 20, 2014, R Vol. I, p. 13, but the filing stamp 
indicates it was filed in chambers on November 19, 2014, R Vol. I, pp. 77 and 182. 
8 R Vol. I, p. 111. 
9 R Vol. I, pp. 174, 178, and 183. 
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Brownstone sought an in 
attorney's fees and $720.57 in costs as set forth in their memorandum of attorney's fees and 
costs and a supporting affidavit, which included an itemized billing for the fees. 10 The 
descriptions in the billings for the work performed are largely generic and vague, but do 
include a few entries specifically referencing work on the defense of Watkins' claims. 11 
Watkins moved to disallow an award of attorney's fees and costs on various grounds. 12 
Watkins first argued that recovery of any fees and costs is limited to the amount of the security 
bond, which had already been met through the damage award. 13 Second, Watkins argued that 
Storms and Brownstone were not the prevailing parties because they had not recovered even 
their attorney's fees from the initial proceedings in 2010 on the TRO ($11,815 in fees, limited 
to the $10,000 bond), let alone the damages they claimed and additional fees that they 
incurred over the next four years, all without any prospect of recovering anything more 
because they did not seek to amend the bond amount, and Watkins obtained a limited 
recovery on its claims against them as well.14 
On June 1, 2015, with the attorney's fees and costs issues still under advisement, the 
parties filed a mutual satisfaction of the original Judgment. 15 
10 R Vol. I, pp. 185-205. 
11 R Vol. I, pp. 196-205. 
12 R Vol. I, p. 206. 
13 R Vol. I, p. 210. 
14 R Vol. I, pp. 215-217. 
15 R Vol. I, p. 14. 
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On court an 
Brownstone's motion for attorney's fees and costs. 16 In granting the motion in part, the court 
reiterated that "[r]ecovery of damages, costs and attorney fees occasioned by the TRO is 
limited to the amount of the bond" 17 and thus not recoverable, \Nhile holding attorney's fees 
from the defense of Watkins' breach of contract claim were recoverable and not limited to the 
amount of the bond. 18 In pertinent part, the court the offered the following analysis: 
As this Court previously found, Rule 65(c) limits recovery of any damages 
or fees incurred as the result of a wrongfully issued preliminary injunction 
bond .... 
The vast majority of the pretrial and trial issues in this matter dealt with 
Watkins' claims for breach of the covenant to repair in the Lease, unjust 
enrichment, and waste. Those issues were not related to the temporary 
restraining order .... 
A fractional portion of the parties' issues, after resolution of the 
temporary restraining order, involved Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaims 
for damages caused by Watkins' wrongful restraint of Storms' and Brownstone's 
efforts to vacate the Premises. That portion of the litigation fell squarely under 
the auspices of the bond and cannot be recovered. 
Although Storms and Brownstone did not clarify the precise amount of 
time devoted to their counterclaim, this Court is very familiar with the pleadings 
filed and the issues tried in this lawsuit. Not more than ten percent (10%) of the 
pleadings, arguments, and trial evidence pertained to Storms' and Brownstone's 
counterclaim. The vast majority of the time, effort, and evidence in this case 
centered upon Watkins' claims for damages under the covenant to repair in the 
parties' Lease. Indeed, this Court's analyses of Storms' and Brownstone's 
16 R Vol. 1, p. 220. On June 3, 2015, after the conclusion of the trial in the matter, but before resolution of all post-
trial motions and the present appeal, the original defendant, Michael Storms passed away. In this same order, the 
court ordered his estate be substituted in as a party in his stead. 
17 R Vol. I, p. 229. 
18 R Vol. I, p. 233. 
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request shall be reduced by ten percent in recognition of the time spent on 
Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaim, which time necessarily fell under the 
auspices of the temporary restraining order bond.19 
That same day, the court entered a First Amended Judgment awarding Storms and 
Brownstone $72,312.36 in attorney's fees and costs. 20 
On September 29, 2015, Watkins timely filed its Notice of Appeal. 21 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Following trial on Watkins' claims for breach of a commercial lease agreement and 
Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaim for damages arising from a temporary restraining 
order, the district court entered judgment to Watkins for $699.64 and to Storms and 
Brownstone for $10,000.00. 22 Storms and Brownstone sought an award of $80,126.50 in 
attorney's fees and $720.57 in costs. 23 Watkins opposed the award.24 The district court 
apportioned 90% of Storms' and Brownstone's attorney's fees to their defense of Watkins' 
claims and only 10% to the pursuit of their counterclaim, thus awarding Storms and 
Brownstone 90% of the total attorney's fees sought. 25 The district court did not base its 
apportionment on the description of work performed in the memorandum of costs, affidavit of 
19 R Vol. !, pp. 233-234 (italics in original.) 
20 R Vol. I, p. 240. 
21 R Vol. I, p. 243. 
22 R Vol. I, p. 183. 
23 R Vol. I, pp. 185-205. 
24 R Vol. I, pp. 206-219. 
25 R Vo!. I, pp. 233-238. 
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or court its apportionment on 
familiar with the pleadings filed and the issues tried in this lawsuit," and that the court's 
"analyses of Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaim accounts for approximately ten percent of 
the 105-page Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 26 Because Idaho !aw requires that 
recoverable attorney's fees be isolated from unrecoverable attorney's fees, and the attorney's 
fees in this case were not, Watkins filed the present appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court commit reversible error when it awarded Storms and 
Brownstone 90% of their total attorney's fees in the case? 
2. Is Watkins entitled to an award of its attorney's fees and costs on appeal under 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 
and 41? 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
26 R Vol. I, p. 234 (italics in original). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING STORMS AND 
BROWNSTONE 90% OF THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES BECAUSE THE FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND THE AWARD IS CONTRARY TO IDAHO LAW. 
A. The Standard Of Review Is Whether The District Court's Findings Of Fact Are Supported 
By Substantial, Competent Evidence. 
In appeals involving issues of attorney's fees, the standard of review is typically abuse of 
discretion. Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 644 (2006) (string citations 
omitted). However, to apply that standard in this case is an oversimplification that misses the 
true nature of the issue on appeal. Here, the issue is not whether attorney's fees should have 
been awarded, but whether there is substantial, competent evidence to support the district 
courfs finding that 90% of Storms' and Brownstone's attorney's fees resulted from the defense 
of Watkins' claims rather than from Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaim. Watkins posits 
that the record does not support the district court's finding and resulting conclusion. Where 
Watkins challenges the district court's finding, this Court has explained the proper standard of 
review as follows: 
When reviewing the district court's decision, this Court determines 
"whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of 
fact support the conclusions of law." This Court will only set aside clearly 
erroneous findings of fact, which are findings not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. "Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would 
accept and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been 
proven." 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL Page 9 of 20 
F:\CLIENTS\BJD\8315 Watkins v, Storms,JI\Appeal\Watkins.Brief on Appeal.doc 
Peterson v. Idaho 
11Substantial competent evidence is 'evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion."' State Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 144 Idaho 312, 314 (2007). 
Thus, because Watkins challenges the evidentiary basis for the district court's finding 
that 90% of Storms' and Brownstone's attorney's fees are attributable to the defense of 
Watkins' claims, the correct standard of review is whether the court's findings are supported 
by substantial, competent evidence. 
B. When A Party Can Recover Attorney's Fees For Some Claims But Not For Others, A Trial 
Court May Not Award Attorney's Fees Unless The Memorandum Of Costs And Affidavit 
Of Counsel Segregate Those Fees That Are Recoverable From Those That Are Not 
Recoverable. 
Without exception, Idaho law has refused to award attorney's fees where the record 
fails to distinguished recoverable attorney's fees from unrecoverable attorney's fees. 
In Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72 (1996), the trial court denied Gigray's 
request for attorney fees because the court could not distinguish between Gigray's attorney's 
fees incurred defending against the breach of contract claim, which were recoverable under 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), and Gigray's fees for pursuing its counterclaim for conversion, 
which fees were not recoverable. The trial court refused to award any attorney's fees because 
it was '"unable by this affidavit to make those findings ... The Court is unable to determine which 
attorney fees were used for the conversion and which were used for the contract action."' Id. 
at 77-78. On appeal, this Court affirmed, stating that "the memorandum of costs was 
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to 
prosecution of counterclaim for conversion. Id. at 78 (emphasis added). The Court did 
not remand the matter to allow the party to amend or supplement its memorandum of costs 
or affidavit of counsel. 
The Court recently reiterated its ruling and reasoning from Brooks, stating that the 
prevailing party "must apportion the fees between the claim upon which it was entitled to 
recover attorney fees and the claim upon which it was not." Advanced Medical Diagnostics, 
LLC, v. Imaging Center of Idaho, LLC, 154 Idaho 812, 815 (2013) (emphasis added). Again, the 
Court did not remand the matter for further proceedings to allow the party to rectify its 
omissions. 
Similarly, in Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497 {1996), the trial court determined 
that the party seeking an award of attorney's fees "had not provided the trial court with a 
meaningful segregation of the attorney fees which were incurred in pursuing a commercial 
contract claim." Id. at 502 (emphasis added). This Court agreed and affirmed the trial court's 
refusal to award any attorney fees. Id. (citing Brooks, supra, 128 Idaho at 78-79). Again, this 
Court did not remand the matter to allow the party to correct the inadequacy of its filings. 
In Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637 (2001L the district court denied the party's 
request for fees "because he could not separate the fees spent on the contract defense from 
the tort counterclaim." Id. at 644. This Court affirmed, explaining that "Where fees were not 
apportioned between a claim that qualifies under I.C. § 12-120(3} and one that does not, no 
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are to be awarded. at cases 
this Court did not remand the case to allow the party to amend or supplement its 
memorandum of costs or affidavit of counsel. 
In Paolini \I Alhortcnn'c Inc ,t=.5 i:ed Anpv 61=. 7 /O+h C•r 2nos} 1not re~o~+ed) 27 "n~:th--lf ' ,, ,, " • , - .._ "-' - , .J I • I L.. V l • fJ A. V / \ J l.. I ~ V \ fJ I L / I t'.; I t: I 
[the district court] nor Albertson's could 'precisely allocate the fees"' between the work on 
matters for which fees were recoverable and those matters for which fees were not 
recoverable. Id. at 669. However, rather than reject the fee request for the inadequate 
description, the district court attempted to calculate the recoverable fees on a "pro rata" basis 
and awarded $142,165.37 in fees. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the fee award, 
rejecting the district court's own sense of "pro rata" justice, and drastically cut the award to 
only $15,933.40, which represented "the amount the court found actually attributable to that 
claim." Id. at 669 (emphasis added). The memorandum of costs and affidavit of counsel did 
provide the necessary detail to justify some award, so without remanding for further 
proceedings, the appellate court reduced the award to the amount of attorney's fees "actually 
attributable" to the claim. 
27 Watkins acknowledges this case is not reported and is offered to the Court solely as persuasive authority with no 
precedential effect. Additionally, Watkins acknowledges the preface to certain unpublished Idaho Court of Appeals 
opinions stating, "No unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. Except to the 
extent required by res judicata, collateral estoppel, the law of the case doctrine or any other similar principle of 
law, no unpublished opinion shall be cited as authority to any court." 
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In v.AH. CV 1 S LMB, WL at 
Aug. 17, 2006) (not reported in F.Supp.2d),28 the federal magistrate denied the prevailing 
party's request for attorney's fees "because the affidavit of counsel does not isolate the fees 
attributable to the defense of the "contract" (warranty) claim from the defense of Plaintiffs' 
negligence claim, attorney1s fees cannot be awarded in this action pursuant to Section 12-
120(3)." Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
In Devine v. Cluff, 110 Idaho 1 (Ct.App. 1986), the court analyzed recoverable and 
unrecoverable attorney fees under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65{c) and stated that the 
party seeking an award of fees "is required to separate the services rendered by his counsel in 
resisting the restraining order and the legal work involved in the other litigated issues." Id. at 4 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). However, similar to the record in Paolini, one of the 
affidavits of counsel in Devine "did purport to segregate out the time spent by the attorney" on 
the claim for which attorney's fees were recoverable, so the appellate court affirmed the trial 
court's award. Id. at 5; see also BECO Construction Company, Inc. v. J-U-8 Engineers Inc., 149 
Idaho 294, 298-299 (2010) (affirming the rule that the memorandum of costs must provide 
sufficient detail for the court to properly apportion fees among the different claims, but finding 
that the memorandum of costs provided sufficient detail). 
2s Id. 
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court must to 
the memorandum of costs, affidavit of counsel, or itemized billings, in order to award 
attorney's fees incurred on claims for which fees are recoverable. If the memorandum of costs 
and affidavit of counsel do not "isolate," "apportion," "separate," or otherwise provide a 
"meaningful segregation" of the fees that are recoverable from those that are not, then the 
trial court may not award those attorney's fees. Even an otherwise reasonable approach based 
on the relative number or success of the claims, such as a pro rata or percentage method, does 
not provide an adequate factual basis for the trial court to make an award. See Paolini, supra. 
An award of fees must be based on an amount "found actually attributable to [the 
recoverable] claim." Id. at 669. 
C. The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Awarded 90% Of Storms' And 
Brownstone's Attorney's Fees Without A Factual Basis In The Memorandum Of Costs 
And Affidavit Of Counsel. 
Here, the district court correctly concluded that Storms and Brownstone could not 
recover any attorney's fees incurred pursuing their counterclaim because "that portion of the 
litigation fell squarely under the auspices of the bond and cannot be recovered." 29 However, 
the court went on and found that Storms and Brownstone could recover 90% of their total 
attorney's fees sought. The court did not base this percentage finding on anything from 
Storms' and Brownstone's memorandum of costs, affidavit of counsel, or itemized billings.30 
29 R Vol. I, p. 233. 
30 R Vol. I, pp. 233-234 (italics in original). 
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court even it 
Brownstone did not clarify the precise amount of time devoted to their counterclaim."31 
The district court attempted to sidestep the admitted lack of evidence to support its 
award by instead reciting that it felt 11very familiar with the pleadings filed and issues tried" and 
estimated that "[n]ot more than ten percent (10%) ... pertained to Storms1 and Brownstone's 
counterclaim."32 The court further based its finding on its observation that it spent 
"approximately ten percent of the 105-page Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" on 
Storms1 and Brownstone1s counterclaim.33 
The district court basing its attornels fee award on its feel for the case is similar to the 
"pro rata 11 approach the district court took in the Paolini case, an approach that may seem 
reasonable at a glance, but like Paolini, is reversible error because it does not follow the law 
and is not based on the facts in the record. The law does not allow the court to impose its own 
sense of justice or to apportion fees based on its "familiarity" with the case. Rather, the law 
requires that the courf s award be based on "the amount the court found actually attributable 
to that claim." Id. at 669. Where the memorandum of costs, affidavit of counsel, and itemized 
billings do not apportion fees between a claim that qualifies for an award and a claim that does 
not, "no fees are to be awarded. 11 Rockefeller, supra, 136 Idaho at 645. 
31 R Vol. I, p. 234. 
32 R Vol. I, p. 234. 
33 R Vol. I, p. 234. (italics in original.) 
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it court no way 
knowing how much time an attorney spends on an issue for which fees are recoverable and on 
an issue for which fees are not recoverable. This is why Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5) 
and 54(e)(5} require that the party seeking an a1,vard of fees and costs timely file a 
memorandum of costs "itemizing each claimed expense" and a supporting affidavit of counsel 
"stating the basis and method of computation of the attorney fees claimed." Sometimes 
parties spend large amounts of time litigating issues for which fees are recoverable. 
Sometimes parties spend large amounts of time litigating issues for which fees are not 
recoverable. Without the itemized memorandum of costs and sworn statement of the 
attorney required by Rule 54, the trial court would have no factual basis to make the findings 
prerequisite to a fee award. The trial court cannot justifiably take an attorney's sworn 
description of work performed and recategorize it to fit the court's perception of the case. 
Idaho law requires that the findings to support a fee award be based on the memorandum of 
costs, affidavit of counsel, and itemized billing. Anything more or less is reversible error. 
The district court's findings in the present case present the same absence of detail to 
apportion fees that existed in Brooks, Advanced Medical, Weaver, Paolini, etc. The trial courts 
in those cases acknowledged that they were unable to find any meaningful distinction in the 
description of charges from the memorandum of costs, affidavit of counsel, or billings. In those 
same cases, the appellate courts affirmed the trial courts' refusal to award fees because there 
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was no factual basis to court in case Id 
acknowledged the same deficiency in this record instead of imposing its own sense of justice. 
D. This Court Should Vacate The District Court's Fee Award And Remand With Instructions 
To Award Storms And Brownstone $495.00 In Attorney1s Fees. 
Unlike the cases cited above where the parties provided no meaningful segregation of 
attorney's fees ultimately received no fee award, the record in the present case admittedly 
does provide some basis to determine what fees Storms and Brownstone incurred that were 
"actually attributable" to defending Watkins' claims. Paolini, supra. Reviewing the 
memorandum of costs and affidavit of counsel as the district court should have done, this 
Court may determine that Storms and Brownstone may recover attorney's fees of $495.00 
based on the following entries that are attributable to Storms' and Brownstone's defense of 
Watkins' claims: 34 
Date Description Charge 
1/7/2014 Research Construction of contracts, Obligation to maintain, $225.00 
obligation to restore premises 
2/12/2014 Telephone Conference with Kelli Eiger from Eastern Idaho Health $45.00 
Department 
2/12/2014 Research cooking hood maintenance standards, fire code $225.00 
requirements 
These are the only itemized entries that apportion time spent defending against 
Watkins' claims.35 The rest of the entries are too vague and generic to provide any 
34 R Vol. I, p. 202. 
35 Watkins notes that there are also partial entries on 3/13/2014 and 9/18/2014 that relate to defending against 
\AJatkins' claims, but these entries are mixed with other generic services performed and state a total day's charge 
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or 
counterclaim. See Weaver, supra, 129 Idaho at 502. Thus, rather than denying Storms and 
Brownstone any fee award as occurred in other cases cited hereinabove, this Court should set 
aside the judgment, vacate the fee award, and remand the case with instructions for the 
district court to award attorney's fees of $495.00 to Storms and Brownstone. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD WATKINS ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS AS THE PREVAILING 
PARTY ON APPEAL. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) requires that "[a]ny party seeking attorney fees on appeal 
must assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by 
such party as provided by Rules 35(a)(S) and 35{b)(S); provided, however, the Supreme Court 
may permit a later claim for attorney fees under such conditions as it deems appropriate." 
Watkins has complied with Idaho Appellate Rule 41 by asserting a claim for attorney's 
fees on appeal as an issue presented on appeal in its first appellate brief. 
Previously, " ... [A] line of authority from the Court of Appeals ... has held that a party may 
not recover attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120 when the issue on appeal is the 
amount of attorney fees awarded by the trial court, rather than the entitlement to an award./J 
BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-8 Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 298 (2010) (citations omitted) 
of $2,025.00 and $2,250.00, respectively. As there is no breakdown of the amount of time spent working on the 
recoverable tasks, these charges fall into the same category of unidentified, undistinguished charges for which 
recovery cannot be had. 
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in since courts may 
when the issue on appeal is the amount of attorney's fees and not the entitlement to fees. Id. 
As Watkins challenges the amount of the district court's fee award, if Watkins prevails on 
appeal, the Court should award Watkins its attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code Section 
12-120(3) as the prevailing party on appeal. This is especially appropriate in this case because 
the attorney fee award is the most significant issue in the case, involving a sum several times 
larger than the principal amount recovered by either party in the case. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 states, "Costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the 
prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." If Watkins prevails on 
appeal, the Court should award Watkins its costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should set aside the First Amended Judgment, 
vacate the district court's order awarding Storms and Brownstone attorney's fees, and remand 
the case with instructions for the district court to award Storms and Brownstone $495.00 in 
attorney's fees. This Court should also award Watkins its costs and attorney's fees on appeal. 
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this 27_ day of April, 2016. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
By:~ 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
The Watkins Company, LLC 
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